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2 
How a Microfinance Network Could Have 





The story shared below sheds light on a hitherto unknown prel-
ude to the Syrian Uprising of March 2011. It is a story of a mi-
crofinance network of sanadiq, or village funds, that was first 
established in an area known as Jabal al-Hoss, southeast of 
Aleppo, and was eventually disseminated throughout rural Syr-
ia. The story begins in 1996, when Syria hosted its first confer-
ence on poverty, and it ends in 2009, after the Syrian 
government shut down the sanadiq established at Jabal al-
Hoss. For a brief period of time, over 7,000 inhabitants of Jabal 
al-Hoss were directly involved in an institutional setup, which 
empowered them politically and financially, and which consti-
tuted a model that was emulated not only in other parts of Syr-
ia, but in Lebanon and Jordan as well. In attacking and 
eventually dismantling this network, the Syrian government 
inadvertently lost an important opportunity to deflate the sense 
of political and economic marginalization of Syria’s rural in-
habitants, which eventually found expression in the Arab 
spring. 
 
I – Context: The Baath & Rural Syria (1970 – 2011) 
Several studies have documented the way in which the Baath 
(post al-harakah al-tashihiyyah or the Correctionist Movement 
of November 13, 1970) has interacted with Syria’s rural areas.2 
The majority of such studies have concluded that by June 2000, 
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when Hafez al-Assad died, there was much that the Baath 
could credibly boast to have accomplished in this domain. 
Though the Baath in essence pursued a socialist policy, it left 
the vast majority of land ownership in rural areas in private 
hands.3 Yes, it curbed the excessively large land holdings, but 
even when it came to the old rural bourgeois, whom the Baath 
encountered in the late 1960s/early 1970s, it did not attempt to 
eliminate them; indeed one might even argue that it invigorated 
them by transforming them from feudal to capitalist land own-
ers.4 Furthermore, the Baath also fostered the creation of a 
middle class in Syria’s rural areas through the Agricultural Co-
operative Bank (ACB), the General Peasants Union (GPU), and 
the thousands of cooperatives that sought to engage everyone 
involved in agricultural production. The Baath even succeeded 
in engaging Syria’s rural inhabitants in what was previously a 
distinctly urban phenomenon, i.e. the networks of privilege and 
corruption.5 Those who the Baath initially left out, i.e. the ex-
tremely poor, were a small minority, which as late as the 1980s 
seemed to be of no real significance. Yet, three major dynam-
ics, at work in the shade, were destined to change this entire 
equation.  
 
 The first of these dynamics was the significant popula-
tion growth rate, which amounted to the doubling of Syria’s 
population every twenty-two years. In 1970, Syria’s total popu-
lation was 6.3 million, and the Baath had to successfully inter-
act with around 3.5 million people living in rural areas. 6 By 
2000, Syria’s total population had reached 16.5 million and its 
rural population was 7.9 million.7 The second dynamic was ed-
ucation. The Baath had indeed succeeded in bringing roads, 
electricity and public schools to Syria’s towns and villages. In 
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the process however, it had created a segment of Syria’s rural 
population that was entirely different than those encountered by 
the Baath in 1970. Not only were the 3.5 million of the 1970s 
rural in geographic terms, but they were also rural in the sense 
that agriculture dominated their lives. Illiteracy rates were high 
and professional aspirations were almost entirely linked to the 
land. By 2000, over 40% of those living in Syria’s rural areas 
were under 14.8 A new generation was in the process of emerg-
ing that was predominately literate, often educated, and in-
creasingly not interested in agriculture. Whatever arable land 
that did exist was firmly in the hands of the old and new rural 
bourgeois, and the majority of this new generation did not be-
long to either. It was a generation that lived in rural areas, but 
outside of the institutional networks, which the Baath had so 
carefully created in rural Syria, and outside of the advantages 
that came through the socialist policies that the Baath had initi-
ated. The third dynamic was the Islamization of Syria’s rural 
areas. The Grand Mufti of Syria, Sheikh Ahmad Kuftaro, had 
accepted, even embraced, an Alawite president of Syria in 
1971, despite the strong objection of many Sunni scholars to 
his position.9 This alliance was further reinforced when Kuftaro 
refused to join the Muslim Brotherhood revolt of 1979. Yet, in 
return for his position, Kuftaro, and the extensive network of 
other religious groups that chose to identify with his approach 
spread their strong sense of Muslim religiosity to Syria’s rural 
areas. Because the regime regarded them as ‘friendly,’ and in 
an attempt to counter the Brotherhood’s accusations of being 
anti-Islamic, they were allowed to conduct their durus, or reli-
gious lessons, and to establish ma’ahid al-asad litahfiz al-
qur’an (the Assad Institutes for Qur’anic Memorization) in the 
numerous mosques that were built all over Syria, rural and ur-
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ban. All this meant that this new generation was also far more 
Muslim in actual practice than previous rural generations in 
Syria.  
 
 This new generation was waiting, indeed thirsty, to be-
ing empowered, but neither economic nor political empower-
ment arrived. That is not to say that nothing was done. In 2001, 
Law no. 71 created the National Programme for Combating 
Unemployment; from which the General Commission of the 
National Programme for Combating Unemployment was creat-
ed.10 A total of 50 billion Syrian pounds was allocated for this 
project. The Fifteenth Five Year Plan (2005-2010) had as one 
of its primary objectives the eradication of poverty through so-
cial and economic development. Within the framework of this 
plan, the National Programme for the Alleviation of Poverty 
was initiated in 2008. In 2009, the General Commission for 
Employment and Project Development was established in co-
operation with public and private banks in Syria. Furthermore, 
in 2010, the Social Welfare Fund was created to provide assis-
tance to poor families throughout Syria with a total budget of 
$250 million. In response to the significant drought, which be-
gan in 2008 and continued well into 2010 (described by the UN 
as the worse in four decades), a large number of Government 
initiatives, often in coordination with UN agencies, were also 
implemented.11 
 
 All of this however, failed to deliver the most important 
ingredient that this new generation expected. A thirst for em-
powerment is not quenched through the distribution of loans, 
regardless how relaxed the terms may be, nor through the dis-
tribution of what amounted to charitable assistance. None of 
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the initiatives that the Syrian government initiated and support-
ed, in the post Hafez al-Assad era, embraced the idea of the es-
tablishment of autonomous financial institutions that were 
entirely managed by the rural poor. There was only one excep-
tion to this, the network of village funds at Jabal al-Hoss. 
 
II - Introducing Microfinance to Syria: (March 1996 – 
March 1998): 
The idea of microfinance, as a government endorsed mecha-
nism for poverty alleviation, arrived in the Syrian Arab Repub-
lic in the mid-1990s. Specifically, in 1994, the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) in Damascus was asked by 
its headquarters in New York to start a discussion with the Syr-
ian government on poverty alleviation and the empowerment of 
the poor through microfinance initiatives.12 Subsequently, a 
series of extensive and often contentious, meetings began be-
tween the UNDP office and its government parallel, the State 
Planning Commission (SPC). Representing UNDP in these dis-
cussions were four individuals who either participated as a 
team or asked one or two members to represent the others: Ky-
aw Lwin Hla, 13 UNDP Resident Representative (RR), El Bella 
Hagona,14 Deputy Resident Representative (DRR), Abdallah 
Dardari,15 Head of the Programme Section, and Omar Imady,16 
Head of the Programme Support Unit. The Syrian Government, 
on the other hand, was represented by Abdel Rahim Subai, 
Minister of State for Planning Affairs,17 his deputy, Tawfiq Is-
mail,18 and Bassam Sibai,19 the Head of International Relations. 
The major intellectual obstacle that needed to be overcome was 
for the Syrian government to acknowledge, openly and formal-
ly, that at least some of its inhabitants, after 30 years of social-
ist rule, can be classified as poor. The SPC preferred the term 
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mahdudi al-dakhil (people of limited income). Discussions 
continued for over a year and seemed to be going nowhere until 
an unexpected breakthrough took place.  
 
 The Minister of Labor and Social Affairs, Ali Khalil,20 
during a meeting with Dardari and Imady, expressed his will-
ingness, not only to acknowledge the existence of poverty in 
Syria, but also to cosponsor in Damascus a regional conference 
on poverty alleviation.21 This embarrassed SPC since it made it 
seem overly concerned with a position that was regarded as 
both unnecessary and unhelpful by other government officials. 
Indeed, a poverty alleviation conference was held in Damascus 
in February 1996. Ali Khalil opened this conference and deliv-
ered a speech that constituted the first public acknowledgment 
of poverty in Syria.22 The ice had indeed been broken and sub-
sequent discussions with SPC regarding programmes that 
would address rural poverty were initiated shortly after the con-
ference. 
 
 In September 1997, Hans Dieter Seibel,23 a German au-
thority on microfinance, arrived in Damascus on a UNDP con-
sultancy with the objective of formulating UNDP’s first project 
document that would directly address rural poverty in Syria. 
Seibel worked closely with Dardari and Imady, and after vari-
ous consultations with SPC and other UN agencies working in 
Syria (IFAD, UNICEF, WHO, FAO, & WFP), it was agreed 
that the project would focus on an area, located 15 KM south-
east of Aleppo city, known as Jabal al-Hoss. This area was se-
lected not only because it was very poor and highly lacking in 
resources, but also because a number of UN agencies had al-
ready initiated activities in some of its villages. The most im-
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portant of these UN interventions was a large reclamation pro-
ject funded by IFAD (with a total budget of $29 million), 
which essentially aimed at purchasing special de-rocking 
equipment that would subsequently be used to reclaim land for 
agricultural use in Jabal al-Hoss.24 The purchase of equipment, 
however, was stalled by bureaucracy, and the implementation 
of project activities was still on hold nearly three years after the 
project was signed. 
 
1.1. Jabal al-Hoss: Major Indicators25 
  
Area: 157,000 ha 
Average Rainfall: 150-250 mm 
Ground water: Aleppo as a whole is a poor basin 
Land Quality: Over 80% of land requires derocking 
Population: 208,000 
Villages: 156 
Population structure: 51% under 15 – 92.9% under 40 
Families: 23,000 
Average Family size: 7.78 
Illiteracy rate 58% 
Percentage of literate population which 




Percentage of population with access to 
medical services: 
12.2% 




Percentage of male heads of 
households who: 
 
      -work exclusively in agriculture 31.8% 
      -work in both agriculture & other 
jobs 
31.2% 
      -work as laborers in factories 15.1% 
      -work as government employees 4% 
      -work as entrepreneurs   1.7% 
      -migrated in search of job 
opportunities 
19.3% 
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Seibel had a general idea of what he wanted to propose: a sus-
tainable mechanism of microfinance that would serve to em-
power the rural poor in Jabal al-Hoss. There was an important 
question, however, that first had to be addressed; namely, how 
would such a mechanism be situated in the overall framework 
of formal and informal rural finance? To answer this question, 
Seibel needed to examine the only formal institution in the late 
1990s engaged in finance operations for Syria's rural poor; 
namely, the Agricultural Cooperative Bank (ACB).  
 
 The ACB can be traced back to the Ottoman bank of 
Mireh (the share of the state in cereal revenues) established in 
1888.26 Its original function was actually that of a tax-in-kind 
collection agency rather than a finance mechanism. Its various 
branches were merged into the Agricultural Bank in 1925. Un-
der the Baath regime, the ACB became a major instrument of 
socialist economic policies. Administratively, it is a state man-
aged cooperative body operating under the supervision of the 
Ministry of Economy. The overlapping relationship between 
the ACB and the GPU is ensured by the fact that two represent-
atives of the GPU are members of the ACB's Board of Direc-
tors. Interest rates of the ACB are fixed by the government. 
The interest rate structure is inverted, which means that interest 
rates on deposits generally exceed lending rates. While deposit 
rates varied from 4-8%, lending rates varied from 4-7.5%. An 
inverted interest rate structure acts as a disincentive for a bank 
to mobilize savings deposits since it loses money with every 
loan it makes. Hence, only 14% of deposits mobilized by the 
ACB in 1997 were passbook savings and term deposits, thereby 
leaving a large savings potential untapped and depriving the 
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rural population of an essential service. Because the inverted 
interest rate structure makes banking unprofitable, the ACB 
had in effect turned into a trading company with 85% of its 
gross income derived from input trading and only 15% from 
banking. In the late 1990s, credit was provided by the ACB 
through 6820 cooperatives to approximately 215,000 farmers. 
In so doing, the ACB neither secured profit of its own, again 
because of its interest rate structure, nor engaged in any serious 
risk because of its strict policy on land collateral. Three major 
types of loans were provided: (i) seasonal and short term loans 
for periods of less than 350 days; (ii) medium-term loans for 
periods of up to 5 years; and (iii) long-term loans for 6-10 
years. Overall, average loan size was 80,000 Syrian pounds 
($1,740 at 1997 exchange rates). Maximum loan size was 
500,000 Syrian pounds and was later increased to 1 million. All 
loans were secured, the vast majority through physical collat-
eral, but also at times through a government paid salary. Loans 
were given solely for productive agricultural purposes. Profita-
ble, yet non-agricultural opportunities, could not be financed by 
the ACB. Nor could emergency situations requiring immediate 
financial inputs. By 1999, the ACB had 266,000 borrowers or 
7% of the adult rural population and 20% of rural households.  
 
Having studied the ACB and after several meetings 
with its managers in Damascus, Seibel concluded that the ACB 
was neither suitable nor interested in becoming the institutional 
host through which microfinance is provided to the rural poor 
in Jabal al-Hoss. In fact, the ACB represented the antithesis of 
what microfinance and the empowerment of the poor stood for. 
The ACB, under the Baath regime, had succeeded in ensuring 
that farmers who own land are provided with a security net-
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work in the form of loans that were frequently given grace pe-
riods or cancelled altogether. Ironically, what this amounted to 
was the creation of a rural middle class by a government that 
took pride in being ideologically anti-bourgeois.27 It also re-
sulted in the financial marginalization of a large segment of the 
rural population since they were effectively outside this safety 
network. When an important segment of the population has no 
access to formal credit, someone has to fill in the gap. 
 
Informal mechanisms of finance were even more pre-
sent in rural areas than the over 6000 agricultural cooperatives. 
Field visits to villages in Jabal al-Hoss, which took place in the 
autumn of 1997 by Seibel, Dardari and Imady confirmed, and 
this was subsequently academically supported by field studies, 
that moneylenders were present in almost every village, provid-
ing loans with interest rates as high as 100%.28 In fact, the very 
segment of the rural population which the Agricultural Bank 
had refused to interact with, i.e. those who cannot provide land 
collateral and/or who do not have a government job, were ef-
fectively in constant debt; and it was debt of a type that sys-
tematically made them poorer. 
 
On the basis of these facts, it became clear that the sus-
tainable microfinance mechanism that UNDP sought to estab-
lish for the inhabitants of Jabal al-Hoss had to be not only 
autonomous from the ACB, but it also had to be locally based 
(on the village level) so as to provide a viable alternative for 
moneylenders. Since visits to Jabal al-Hoss had also pointed to 
a very strong religious discomfort with the idea of interest, irre-
spective of its rate, it also became clear that for this micro-
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finance mechanism to be truly sustainable, it had to be con-
sistent with the values of the people it sought to serve.29 
 
 
III - Establishing a Network of Village Funds: (March 1998 
– August 2001) 
The preparation of the first UNDP project document for a mi-
crofinance project in Syria took place over the period Septem-
ber 1997 to March 1998. The document was prepared by 
Seibel, with inputs from both Dardari and Imady. The total 
amount of funds allocated for the project was $1,331,000.000, 
of which $500,000 was to be allocated for the microfinance 
scheme.30 The star component of this document was of course 
the sanduq (plural sanadiq) or village fund. The sanduq was 
conceived as an institutionalized and significantly more ad-
vanced version of the jam’iyah (lit. association, but used also to 
denote a group of people who agree to circulate their collected 
funds on a regular basis amongst them). Aware of the complex-
ities that only become clear when actual implementation be-
gins, Seibel deliberately articulated the idea of the village fund 
in general terms. There were, however, principles that could 
not be violated:31  
 
(i) Self-reliant: Yes the sanadiq would be injected with 
funds from UNDP, but only after local resources were mobi-
lized. 
(ii) Self-managed: Seibel chose to ignore everything that 
was shared with him regarding the multiple layers of govern-
ment-sponsored institutions, which, according to SPC, must be 
involved in the implementation of project activities. The SPC 
frequently emphasized that the General Peasants Union, the 
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General Women’s Union (GWU1) and the General Workers’ 
Union (GWU2), which were in fact government funded and 
managed, were the ‘natural choice’ for the management of the 
sanadiq.32 Instead, Seibel emphasized self-management and the 
project document was eventually signed with this principle in-
cluded.  
(iii) Consistent with local values: As noted above, the inhab-
itants of Jabal al-Hoss repeatedly emphasized during field visits 
that they were uncomfortable with the idea of interest and that 
they only go along with it because no other alternative existed. 
Ironically, it was the younger generation that seemed the least 
comfortable with interest. Jabal al-Hoss, as was the case with 
many other rural areas in Syria, had undergone a process of Is-
lamization which may be traced roughly to the early 1970s, and 
which manifested itself not only with discomfort with interest 
because of the Quranic ruling against usury, but also with the 
widespread building of mosques and the relinquishment of tra-
ditional female attire for a more urban version of Sunni con-
servatism.33 
(iv) Women empowerment: UNDP was determined to pre-
vent the village funds from becoming male dominated institu-
tions. Special attention was given to ensure full female 
participation in the management of, and accessibility to, the 
village funds.   
 
 In March 1998, after having been favorably reviewed 
by the Minister of Agriculture, As’ad Mustafa,34 SPC put aside 
its reservations and agreed to sign the project document. 
“SYR/97/004, Community Development at Jabal al-Hoss” was 
signed by the Minister of Agriculture, the Minister of State for 
Planning Affairs and the Resident Representative of UNDP on 
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March 31, 1998.  
 
 Indeed, the birth and eventual blooming of the village 
funds in rural Syria would not have been possible without the 
regular intervention of a number of senior government officials 
who, irrespective of whether or not they were important mem-
bers of the Baath establishment, clearly proved to be reformers 
at heart. Their reformist tendencies were not a secret though 
they exhibited significant wisdom in how and when they chose 
to make such tendencies known. The first such reformer was 
Ali Khalil, a member of the Naserist Socialist Arab Union Par-
ty which was represented in al-jabaha al-wataniyyah al-
taqadumiyyah (the National Progressive Front), who took it 
upon himself to proclaim that Syria does indeed have poverty; 
rural poverty in particular. The second was As’ad Mustafa, a 
long standing Baathist, who remained an important supporter 
of the project until December 13, 2001 when a new cabinet was 
appointed. Mustafa is now a well-known dissident who has re-
cently been appointed as the Minister of Defence under the Na-
tional Syrian Coalition. Mohammad Imady,35 the Minister of 
Economy, a non-Baathist American educated technocrat, was 
also an important supporter of the project. At several points in 
the project’s life, he ensured that the ACB, which administra-
tively belonged to the Ministry of Economy, would not forcibly 
impose itself on the financial implementation of the project, 
and regularly provided the advice that to the extent possible 
project achievements should not be publicized until they have 
fully bloomed. Finally, Abdallah Dardari, also a non-Baathist 
and Western educated, in both his capacities as president of 
SPC and Deputy Prime Minister for economic Affairs, tried to 
protect the network of microfinance created in Jabal al-Hoss, as 
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will be elaborated below. 
 
Although the project was signed on March 31, 1998, ac-
tual implementation of project activities did not begin until 
September 1999. It took a year and a half to identify qualified 
project staff that were acceptable to UNDP, SPC and the Min-
istry of Agriculture. Though the length of this period seems 
difficult to understand, it was not at all unusual with such pro-
jects to experience administrative delays, especially as UNDP 
project staff would be eligible to salaries that were higher than 
the national average. Abdel Razzaq Duqsi, an agricultural en-
gineer from Aleppo and an employee of the Ministry of Agri-
culture, was eventually selected as the National Project 
Director (NPD). Indeed, Duqsi was to become a highly instru-
mental figure in the story of microfinance in Jabal al-Hoss. He 
possessed a natural talent of adaptation and very strong diplo-
matic skills, which enabled him to absorb the idea of micro-
finance, as articulated by Seibel, and transplant it into the 
culture of Jabal al-Hoss. Duqsi was also fortunate to identify a 
number of individuals who would enthusiastically embrace the 
project’s objectives and remain part of its team until the very 
end, Mahmoud al-As’ad, Senior Finance Officer, and Nashwa 
Abd al-Karim, Women Empowerment Officer. 
 
The first challenge faced by Duqsi was to organize what 
were possibly the first non-ideologically driven elections in 
post-Baath Syria.36 Each fund was to have a management 
committee, freely elected by its members for a one year-term, 
which had the responsibility of managing its financial opera-
tions. The committee was also responsible for admitting or re-
jecting new members, beyond the initial founding members, 
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and for providing the first necessary layer of approval for a 
loan to be processed.37 Duqsi would later share how he was 
frequently visited by members of the security who were clearly 
uncomfortable with these elections, and with the lack of direct 
participation by the ACB and the PU. While Duqsi’s skills in 
diplomacy were frequently tested, he continued to assert that he 
is merely implementing an agreement between the Syrian gov-
ernment and an international organization and that any serious 
objection should be brought up with higher authorities. This 
argument protected the project and Duqsi until his dismissal in 
November 2005.  
 
The first indicators on the progress of the project clearly 
attested to Duqsi’s successful management. By December 31, 
2000, nine sanadiq had been established, with a total of 1,025 
members, of which 355 were women.38 The total amount of 
resources mobilized locally was 1,866,500 Syrian pounds (a 
remarkable achievement given the fact that SPC was convinced 
that no one would be willing to deposit their own savings in 
such a project, if in fact they had savings to begin with); of 
which 613,000 constituted the share of funds deposited by 
women.39 The equity grant provided by UNDP, on the other 
hand, was 4,300,000 Syrian pounds.40 Because the funds oper-
ated on the Islamic principle of murabaha (sale on profit), bor-
rowers did not receive cash in hand but rather the process of 
lending followed these steps: members of a sanduq would fill 
out an application for a loan that included their description of 
the activity that they wished to fund. After the application was 
reviewed by the village committee, examined by relevant ex-
perts from the project staff and finally approved by the NPD, 
borrowers would be accompanied by a designated project staff 
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member to the market where the needed inputs would be pur-
chased by the sanduq representative.41 When repayment was 
due, the loan had to be returned to the fund plus a percentage of 
the profit, which was set at the time the loan was provided.  
 
‘The hour of truth,’ as it came to be known by those in-
volved in the project, was when the first repayments of loans 
were due; namely, June 30, 2001. The major question was: 
would borrowers who were not bound by a formal collateral 
contract repay their loans? This question, of course, had very 
important implications since the modus operandi of the ACB 
was based on the premise that repayment is only possible when 
collateral was secured. On June 30, 2001, 74% of the borrow-
ers repaid their loans. Coordination between project staff and 
the committees of the sanadiq resulted in a 98.9% repayment 
rate by mid-July, and a 100% rate by mid-September.42 Clearly, 
the idea that a self-reliant, self-managed, and values-consistent 
financial mechanism was capable of fostering a culture within 
which repayment is secured despite the absence of formal col-
lateral had been vindicated. 
 
 
IV - Rural Success & Urban Neglect (August 2001 – Janu-
ary 2003) 
The sanadiq created in Jabal al-Hoss grew to levels no one, not 
even the most optimistic of those who supported them, predict-
ed. By December 2002, a total of twenty-two village funds had 
been established in Jabal al-Hoss. The number of shareholders 
had grown from 1,025 in December 2000 to 4,691; of which 
41% were women. The total capital had grown from 6.2 million 
Syrian pounds in December 2000 to 27.71 million; of which 
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6.48 million Syrian pounds were mobilized from the inhabit-
ants of Jabal al-Hoss. The average return on equity rose from 
12.3% in December 2001 to 17%, while the number of loans 
had grown from a mere 92 in December 2000 to a spectacular 
1,020 in December 2002, and the repayment rate stood at 
99.7%.43 Furthermore, a sanduq markazi, or Central Fund, had 
been created with an initial funding of 5.565 million Syrian 
pounds.44  In addition to these achievements, a database had 
been created to regularly update human development indicators 
in Jabal al-Hoss (which was destined to become the prototype 
of Syria’s first National Human Development Report).45 An 
Executive Board for the entire region of Jabal al-Hoss, bringing 
together elected members of the individual funds, had also been 
established.  
 
It was clear for any analytic observer that these num-
bers pointed towards something very significant. Over 4000 
men and women were engaged in an institutional activity that 
allowed them to elect their own representatives and to manage 
their own finances in a manner that was entirely outside the 
existing political/economic framework. With an average 
household of over seven, nearly 28,000 inhabitants of Jabal al-
Hoss were directly affected by this phenomenon. Equally im-
portant is the fact that whatever was taking place could not 
possibly be dismissed as unsuccessful or not rewarding. Indeed, 
if all of this can take place outside of the sponsorship of Baath 
institutions, i.e. the ACB, PU, GWU1, GWU2, what does this 
say about the effectiveness, indeed the necessity of such institu-
tions? 
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These questions however, were not being asked, not 
openly at least. The project had proven to be a success, had 
achieved its objectives and had already been extended twice 
beyond its original end date in 2000. All energies were now 
focused on the second Phase of the project.  The preparation of 
Phase II of Community Development at Jabal al-Hoss began in 
2002. This time, it was Omar Imady, who had left his position 
at UNDP in April 2001 to pursue the career of an UN consult-
ant, who was asked to prepare the project document. Inputs 
were provided by both Seibel and Duqsi. The total amount al-
located for Phase II was $2 million of which $500,000 was 
from UNDP and $1.5 million was provided by the Japanese 
government, the first such cost-sharing agreement in the history 
of UNDP Syria.46 The Japanese Ambassador had visited Jabal 
al-Hoss and was extremely impressed with project achieve-
ments to the extent that he made an immediate offer to provide 
funds towards Phase II.  
 
The primary rationale for Phase II of Community De-
velopment at Jabal al-Hoss was that a very critical aspect per-
taining to the sustainability of the village funds was yet to be 
addressed. Indeed, outside of the legal cover of a UNDP project 
document, there was no institutional framework that guaranteed 
the sustainability of the sanadiq at Jabal al-Hoss. Phase II of 
the project was designed to address this shortcoming through 
the creation of an association of village funds that is linked 
administratively to the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor.47 
Associations in Syria operated under the Law of Associations 
(No. 93 of 1958 and its subsequent amendments: Legislative 
Decree 224 of 1969, Ministerial Decree of 1971, and Law No. 
22 of 1974). Administratively, associations in Syria fell under 
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the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor, 
which monitored their activities and audited their financial af-
fairs,48 though security officials were highly involved behind 
the scenes in all affairs pertaining to associations in Syria. The 
idea of creating an association was based on the premise that of 
all the existing alternatives, this constituted the least politicized 
option, and as will be noted below, was inspired by the suc-
cessful creation of similar associations. By the end of Phase II 
of the project, all financial and organizational responsibilities 
of the village funds were to be handed over entirely to this 
newly created association.  
 
The strategic framework for Phase II of the project was 
grounded in five major principles, which in their totality consti-
tuted the primary lessons learned from Phase I and which were 
articulated in the project document as follows:49 
 
(i) Extracting the psychology of waiting, which empha-
sized the idea that the project cannot succeed as long as the in-
habitants of Jabal al-Hoss believed that it was the government’s 
responsibility to help them. Extracting this psychological ap-
proach to change, reinforced over four decades of Baathist so-
cialism, was perhaps the most important challenge, which 
project staff faced when interacting with the rural population.  
(ii) Local resources first. Participatory development was 
taken to a new horizon in Jabal al-Hoss through the insistence 
of the project that UNDP funds would not be accessible until 
and unless local resources were first mobilized. No other UN 
project in Syria had ever asked its target population to mobilize 
their own resources prior to being eligible for receiving assis-
tance.  
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(iii) Taking culture seriously. The rural inhabitants of Syria 
made it very clear that they cannot be expected to take the initi-
ative if their values were not respected. Thus, a system of mi-
crofinance following Islamic principles was developed and 
refined over time. 
(iv) Always begin with marketing. Development interven-
tions cannot be artificially separated from the real world, where 
in the final analysis it is the laws of supply and demand that 
apply. Hence, emphasis is placed not on what type of income 
generating activity could be undertaken in Jabal al-Hoss, but 
rather on which activity had a definite market. Armed with this 
approach, novel ideas such as utilizing the dome-shaped mud 
houses, found in Jabal al-Hoss and all over rural Syria, for 
mushroom production were proposed and implemented with 
significant success.50  
(v) Respecting the principle of time. An actual change in 
the standards of living in the framework of a five-year project 
is not a realistic objective, at least not for the majority of the 
population addressed. What is not only realistic, but desirable 
is the institutionalization of the process of development. Only 
through respecting the principle of time can organic institutions 
be created that are self-managed and self-reliant.  
 
On January 29, 2003, “SYR/02/001 Community Develop-
ment at Jabal al-Hoss II” was signed by Tawfiq Ismail, Head of 
SPC, and Taoufik Ben Amara, the UNDP Resident Representa-
tive. The signing ceremony was attended by the Japanese Am-
bassador and a representative from the Ministry of Agriculture. 
One would have expected this event to receive significant at-
tention from the media. In fact, the event was largely ignored. 
This, however was not surprising, not at least for those who 
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were directly involved in promoting this project. A deliberate 
policy of neglect of everything related to Jabal al-Hoss was 
sensed as early as 2001. 
 
It was in fact in July 2001 that the Fund for Integrated Ru-
ral Development of Syria (FIRDOS) was established under the 
patronage of Asma al-Assad, the British-Syrian First Lady of 
Syria.51 When news first emerged of the creation of FIRDOS, 
UNDP Syria felt that this would clearly pave the path towards 
endowing the microfinance network it had created in Jabal al-
Hoss with formal and subsequently legal legitimacy, especially 
since FIRDOS was created under the Law of Associations. No 
one expected the systematic neglect that followed. Asma al-
Assad, who during these years travelled extensively throughout 
rural Syria, visited the project site only once in January 2007, 
seven years after its inception. A list of needed supportive ac-
tions was presented to her, and none of these requests were at 
any point addressed. On several occasions, she would visit a 
village only miles away from a village fund, and yet leave the 
area without any form of contact with project staff.52 All of this 
was taking place despite the fact that the UNDP office was 
consistently sending invitations to FIRDOS in the hope that 
Asma al-Assad, or anyone else from FIRDOS would pay a visit 
to a village fund in Jabal al-Hoss and see for themselves all the 
achievements that had taken place. Ironically, one of the key 
pillars of the newly created FIRDOS was Nouar al-Shara’a, the 
daughter of Farouk al-Shara’a the Vice President of Syria, who 
had earlier worked at the UNDP office and was well acquainted 
with the achievements of the Jabal al-Hoss project. Since 
Nouar al-Shara’a had consistently expressed her admiration of 
the project’s achievements, the decision to ignore the Jabal al-
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Hoss project was clearly higher than her.53 At no point did any 
of the representatives of FIRDOS directly reach out to UNDP 
nor to the Jabal al-Hoss project staff, not even for the mere co-
ordination of efforts since FIRDOS would eventually disperse 
loans in some of the villages of Jabal al-Hoss. International and 
national experts on microfinance were regularly contracted by 
FIRDOS, but none who were linked in any way to the Jabal al-
Hoss project. Furthermore, the microfinance scheme, which 
FIRDOS eventually adopted violated all of the five principles 
of Phase II outlined above.  
 
That FIRDOS, an institution created during the reign of a 
president officially described as a reformer, would hold such a 
dismissive attitude towards a UN sponsored project that was 
trying to achieve precisely what FIRDOS aspired to achieve, is 
one of the many anomalies that became apparent after Bashar 
al-Assad came to power.  Thus, one comes to appreciate the 
irony that lies in the fact that some of the most important 
achievements of Jabal al-Hoss took place prior to the death of 
Hafez al-Assad and in the period when members of his old 
team still held positions in the government. That is not to say 
that achievements pertaining to the alleviation of poverty -- not 
related to Jabal al-Hoss -- did not take place. Indeed, and pri-
marily to Dardari’s credit, there were several very important 
achievements in the realm of documentation and analysis; such 
as the publication in 2005 of “Poverty in Syria: 1996-2004 Di-
agnosis and Pro-Poor Policy Considerations,” the most com-
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V - Disseminating the Experience (January 2003 – October 
2005):  
The signing of Phase II of Community Development at Jabal 
al-Hoss in January 2003 meant that the achievements of the 
project could now continue. Indeed, by the end of 2003, the 
number of sanadiq had grown to thirty, and the number of 
shareholders to 6,468. Total capital reached 63.7 million Syrian 
pounds, of which 10.6 million constituted the total value of 
shares.55 
 
In late 2003, UNDP’s Resident Representative, Taoufik 
Ben Amara, left Syria and a new Resident Representative ar-
rived, Ali Za’tari. Having heard about the significant achieve-
ments of Community Development at Jabal al-Hoss, and aware 
of the strongly held views against the project, which some in-
fluential members of the Syrian government held, Za’tari wise-
ly proposed that an independent international mission would 
visit the project to prepare a comprehensive review. A mission 
arrived in early 2004, comprised of Deena Burjorjee and Judith 
Brandsma from the United Nations Capital Development Fund 
(UNCDF), and by May had concluded its report. The report in 
fact, covered microfinance in Syria as a whole, but with special 
focus on Community Development in Jabal al-Hoss. The report 
concluded: 
 
“… this programme is the only known pro-
gramme in the region that is owned by members 
[villagers] who buy shares and get an annual 
dividend on their share holding. It is a model 
that could be replicated in other rural areas 
where social cohesion is strong.”56 
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The positive review of the project, which this report contained, 
served to secure the support of UNDP’s new leadership in Syr-
ia, but beyond that, it had little impact. 
 
As noted above, IFAD had a large investment project in Jabal 
al-Hoss, which was visited frequently by international IFAD 
consultants. During such missions, these experts would visit the 
village funds and closely examine their progress. By mid-2002, 
IFAD was already convinced that the idea of sanadiq had sig-
nificant potential and should be incorporated into its own pro-
jects. Between June 2002 and March 2004, Imady, at times 
alongside Seibel, was asked to incorporate, in various degrees 
and project-life stages, the idea of the sanduq into the follow-
ing IFAD projects:  
 
• The Idleb Agricultural Development Project (Idleb 
Governorate);57 
• The Southern regional agricultural development project 
II (Sweida, Dara’a, and Qunaytra governorates);58 and 
• The Badia Rangeland Development Project (Raqqa, Di-
er Ezzor, Hama and Hassakah governorates).59 
 
So impressed was IFAD by the effectiveness of the sanadiq 
that it also asked Imady to incorporate the concept into two re-
gional projects as well: 
 
• October – November 2003, Small Holder Livestock 
Rehabilitation Project (Bekaa, Lebanon);60 
• January – March 2004, Agricultural Resources Man-
agement Project (Karak, Tafileh, Jordan). 61 
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Not only was the idea being replicated, coordination mech-
anisms were being established between the various sanadiq in 
Syria. Jabal al-Hoss now had its own national consultants in the 
field of microfinance and women empowerment, who regularly 
visited other project sites and who at times were asked to con-
tribute to IFAD projects in Syria and Jordan.62 The institutional 
fabric of rural Syria was undergoing a significant change, but it 
was one that lacked not only official patronage but also a legal 
framework. Despite the continuous efforts to obtain formal au-
thorization for the creation of an association of village funds at 
Jabal al-Hoss, and subsequently in other parts of rural Syria, 
the Ministry of Social Affairs never received the ‘green light’ 
to provide such an authorization from the security establish-
ment, a known and critical prelude to formalization. Talk of a 
forthcoming law on microfinance provided hope that the 
sanadiq would find a legal shelter within the framework of new 
financial legislation. Meanwhile, a new cabinet was formed in 
September 2003 and Adel Safar was appointed as Minister of 
Agriculture.63 For reasons that remain unclear, Safar turned 
strongly against Duqsi in 2004, and despite the continuous 
achievements of the project (7,347 shareholders by December 
2004),64 Safar seemed adamant at removing Duqsi from his 
post.  
 
On November 21, 2005, Safar formally dismissed Duqsi 
from his position as National Project Director (NPD). Khaled 
al-Qatini, from the University of Aleppo, was designated as his 
replacement.65 A news article that covered this event spoke of a 
ministerial evaluation mission which came across a number of 
important problems in how the project was being implemented. 
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Significantly, the major point that was raised was the principle 
of murbaha, or the principle of Islamic sale for profit, which 
was described as unfair to the rural inhabitants, despite the fact 
that the earnings were partly allocated as dividends to the 
shareholders and partly deposited as retained earnings in the 
sanduq.66 Nothing was said about the major indisputable indi-
cators, which were recognized by the Syrian government, and 
acknowledged by all parties concerned as reflective of unprec-
edented success in the realm of microfinance. To his credit, 
Za’tari, UNDP’s Resident Representative, formally objected to 
this decision and al-Qatini lasted no more than one week as 
NPD of the project. Mahmoud al-Asa’ad, the Senior Finance 
Officer of the project, was designated as interim NPD until 
March 2006 when Ali Rida Kayali, who was an NPD for a pro-
ject pertaining to the collapse of the Zeyzoun dam, was desig-
nated as Duqsi’s formal replacement. 
  
Not only did the removal of Duqsi have an impact on how 
the project was managed, but it also had a profound impact on 
the trust and confidence which members of the sanadiq once 
had in this project. The inhabitants of Jabal al-Hoss, who had 
closely worked with Duqsi, perceived his removal as the be-
ginning of the end of their experience with political and finan-
cial empowerment. The events that unfolded after 2005 sadly 
proved just how correct they were. 
 
VI - Suspending & Dismantling the Network of Village 
Funds (October 2005 – December 2008):  
Just as Ali Za’tari, the Resident Representative of UNDP Syria, 
had asked for a review mission upon his arrival in Syria at the 
end of 2003 in order to clear any doubt on the merits of what 
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UNDP was implementing in Jabal al-Hoss, he again asked for 
another independent mission after Duqsi’s ouster in order to 
determine whether or not the critique of the Ministry of Agri-
culture was valid. A mission arrived in December 2005 and 
prepared a report which concluded:  
 
“Based on the UNCDF mission findings and the 
field observations and borrowers’ interviews 
during the current mission, we believe that the 
Jabal Al-Hoss project has established a success-
ful model for extending needed financial ser-
vices, namely savings and loans to poor 
villagers. The two unique features of the project 
are: 1) It utilizes the Islamic principle for lend-
ing “Murabaha” which is widely accepted by 
the local community, thereby eliminating sensi-
tivities to access loans, and 2) It provides the 
local community with self-empowerment mech-
anisms represented in the establishment of the 
Sanduq through shares paid by villagers, with a 
high percentage of women participation. After 
appropriate fine-tuning and proper documenta-
tion of the experience, the Jabal Al-Hoss project 
could be considered as a pioneer model for rep-
lication in other rural areas in Syria.” 67 
 
Indeed, the independent mission had once again vindicated the 
experience, and once again the findings were ignored.  
 
 As noted above, Ali Rida Kayali, became the NPD in 
March 2006. The experience of Community Development at 
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Jabal al-Hoss during Kayali’s tenure is perhaps best described 
as having been suspended. Kayali neither encouraged the fur-
ther growth of the sanadiq (thereby ensuring that he was pro-
tected from the wrath of the Minister of Agriculture), nor did 
he seek to modify the way in which the sanadiq had been so far 
managed. The indicators of the experience also point to a stabi-
lization of the achievements. While the number of shareholders 
grew from 6,468 in 2003 to 7,347 in 200468 (during which time 
Duqsi was still the NPD of the project), the number of share-
holders in 2008 had grown only to 7,459. The number of 
sanadiq was still 32 (as it was in 2004).69  
 
 The most important indicator, however, is the total 
amount of equity available: 101,860,059 Syrian pounds in 
2007.70 The significance of this number lies in the fact that it 
relates to the last attempt to create an autonomous institution 
that would protect the sanadiq after Phase II of the project was 
completed. As noted earlier, the initial attempt was to create an 
association under the umbrella of the Ministry of Social Affairs 
and Labor. The authorization to create this association was 
never obtained. In February 2007, Law No. 15 on Microfinance 
was issued and the Syrian government, during a Project Steer-
ing Committee meeting, decided that since the new law al-
lowed for the creation of microfinance institutions, the sanadiq 
should be transformed into such an institution.71  This decision, 
however, entirely disregarded a highly important fact; namely, 
that the new law specified that the minimal equity for any insti-
tution created under its framework is 250 million Syrian 
pounds, whereas, as noted above, the total equity of the project 
in 2007 was 101,860,059.00 Syrian pounds. In other words, the 
project was 150 million Syrian pounds short (approx. $3 mil-
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lion at 2008 exchange rates). There were no suggestions or 
strategies proposed on how such an amount would be mobi-
lized, especially since the same Project Steering Committee 
meeting decided that the project would be completed and trans-
ferred entirely to government jurisdiction by December 2008 at 
the latest. A final attempt to save the sanadiq was made in the 
spring of 2007. Dardari, who was well aware of the danger fac-
ing the sustainability of the sanadiq in Jabal al-Hoss, and in 
turn of all sanadiq created in rural Syria, solicited the help of a 
Malaysian organization involved in global microfinance with 
the purpose of providing the needed funds to create a micro-
finance organization under Law No. 15. However, once again, 
this attempt failed.72 
 
 UNDP staff members, aside of course from Duqsi, re-
mained at Jabal al-Hoss until December 2008. Mahmoud al-
Asa’ad, Senior Finance Officer, and Nashwa Abdel Karim, 
Women Empowerment Officer, were left to witness the disin-
tegration of what was once a vibrant experience. By 2008, the 
inhabitants of Jabal al-Hoss had lost their enthusiasm and pride 
in the sanadiq they managed. They felt both helpless and bitter 
towards what was clearly about to take place. In December 
2008, a government committee arrived to oversee the transfer 
of all administrative and financial documents of the sanadiq to 
the Ministry of Agriculture. Soon after, the funds were trans-
ferred to the ACB, the shares were returned to the inhabitants, 
the sanadiq were formally closed and it was made known that, 
henceforth, loans would only be provided on the basis of the 
laws and procedures of the ACB. All the doubts that the inhab-
itants of Jabal al-Hoss once shared with Seibel, Duqsi and 
Imady, back in 1999, regarding the government’s willingness 
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to allow for truly self-managed and self-reliant financial institu-
tions to be established in their villages, the very doubts UNDP 
had promised would not be allowed to materialize, had come 
true. 
 
 After rural Aleppo joined the protests in late 2011, in-
cluding Jabal al-Hoss, the inhabitants fell victim to the same 
type of violent response protestors faced elsewhere. It is, in-
deed, an ironic ending for the story of Community Develop-
ment at Jabal al-Hoss that the project’s main headquarters 
would be shelled and destroyed by the Syrian army in Ramadan 
(July) 2012, under the pretext of terrorist activities. 
 
 
VII - Community Development at Jabal al-Hoss & the Syr-
ian Uprising – How Real is the Relationship? 
 
“This is the first time in the history of Syria that 
we find peasants protesting against the Baath.”73  
Muhammad Salman, ex-Minister of Information 
& the Head of the ‘National Democratic Initia-
tive’  
– August, 2011. 
 
If there is one characteristic that the majority of analysts who 
have examined the Syrian Uprising agree upon, it is the pre-
dominantly rural nature of this phenomenon.74 Yes, cities like 
Dara’a, Homs, Hama, Idleb and Dier Ezzor were clearly en-
gaged, but the two major cosmopolitans of Damascus and 
Aleppo, embracing nearly half the population, were definitely 
late comers. So thoroughly rural was this phenomenon that 
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when Damascus and Aleppo finally began to join, it was in ac-
tual fact their rural areas, and subsequently, the more immedi-
ate suburbs that were inflamed in protest. In the case of 
Damascus, the first circle stretched from Darayyah in the ex-
treme southwest, to Zabadani in the extreme northwest. The 
second, drew closer and took root in such suburbs as Kafar 
Souseh, Duma, Tal and Qudsayyah. That is not to say that what 
might be called ‘central’ Damascus and Aleppo were void of 
sympathizers with the Uprising. In fact, both witnessed im-
portant protests during the early days of the Uprising, and both 
gave birth to key leading figures of the Uprising. But in the fi-
nal analysis, the energy and dynamism of the Uprising did not 
emanate from these major cosmopolitans.75 In fact, it would 
have been so much easier for the regime had the Uprising been 
a primarily urban phenomenon, as was the case in the 1980s. 
The Muslim Brotherhood of the 1980s did not draw its sympa-
thizers from the villages. It was a very urban phenomenon and 
was primarily manifested in the city of Hama, though it did 
succeed in recruiting members from middle class families in 
Damascus and Aleppo.76 Not one of the villages we so often 
hear about today, e.g. Teftanaz, Ariha, Kafarnubul, etc. were 
part of the revolt of the 1980s. In fact, it was from Syria’s rural 
areas that those who suppressed the events of the 1980s and 
who continued to safeguard the regime in subsequent years 
were recruited. Al-Rastan, for example (the rural town of Mus-
tapha Tlas), gave almost its entire male offspring as volunteers 
to the Syrian army, only to become one of the strongest points 
of resistance after 2011.77  
 
 Why then did these rural areas rise in this way, if in fact 
they were previously one of the major foundations of the Baath 
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regime? Of course one can emphasise the impact of the drought 
noted above. Another possible explanation lies in how the re-
gime dealt with these protests. Criticism of the ‘security op-
tion’, as it has come to be known, is abundant by both enemies 
and friends of the regime. The way in which the government 
interacted with these protests may explain the stubbornness and 
how inflamed they became, but it is not adequate to explain 
what sparked them in the first place. Some of the earliest foot-
age of the protests in Dara’a shows a deliberate attack on the 
offices of Syiatel, the mobile company owned and managed by 
Rami Makhlouf.78 This was an economic statement and a very 
loud one. The rural inhabitants of Syria in the 1980s could 
comfort themselves by pointing at the roads that were paved, 
the schools that were built and the electricity that was delivered 
to their rural areas. In 2011, all they could see was the immense 
divide between the lifestyles they pursued in their rural towns 
and villages and between those pursued by the middle and up-
per-middle class in Damascus and Aleppo; and if they were 
destined to continue to live in this way, the least they could ex-
pect from the Baath regime was respect. To deny them both, is 
to demand of them what their sense of self could not possibly 
submit to.  
 
 In fairness to the Syrian government, the demographic 
changes that Syria had undergone since the Baath took power 
are difficult for anyone to grasp. Syria had grown from a mere 
6.3 million in 1971, when Hafez al-Assad took power, to nearly 
23 million in 2011.79 This constitutes overwhelming pressure 
on any economic development plan. Nevertheless, something 
could have been done. Something pre-emptive and something 
visionary. This is where the story of Community Development 
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at Jabal al-Hoss comes in. The dismantling of the network of 
sanadiq in Jabal al-Hoss clearly did not cause the Uprising. No 
such hypothesis is being proposed here. However, the critical 
question is: ‘Had the Syrian government allowed for this net-
work of self-managed, self-reliant and culturally sensitive net-
work to spread all over rural Syria; had it provided it with the 
legal cover it required; had we been able in 2011 to speak of 
6,400 sanadiq rather than 6,400 government controlled cooper-
atives, would the Syrian Uprising have found that same thirst in 
rural areas to protest against the government?’ People protest, 
even when tanks are unleashed against them, when they have 
nothing to lose. Sadly, one of the most common statements that 
would be shared by the inhabitants of Jabal al-Hoss during the 
period when the sanadiq were most successful was: ‘… for the 
first time we feel like we have something of our own.’ 
 
 Finally, one must ask: why did the Syrian government 
close down this network? Was it a premeditated and intentional 
plan to prevent a financial network of this nature from taking 
root in rural areas; or were the decisions that led to its downfall 
those of individuals who meant well but lacked an adequate 
understanding of what was truly at stake?’ It is difficult to 
prove that there was an actual conspiracy against the sanadiq of 
Jabal al-Hoss. Nevertheless, the climate that was conducive for 
such a hostile attitude towards the sanadiq was, indeed, a natu-
ral extension of how the political and security establishment 
approached institutional activity that was not part of, or directly 
linked to, the official institutional layers of the regime. Evi-
dence of how suspicious and distrustful the Syrian government 
is of any form of institutions that are autonomous in nature, 
however conciliatory their official line is, is found in a much 
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earlier spring than that of 2011. Indeed, it was in the spring of 
2001 that very fluid institutions, known as muntadayat (singu-
lar muntada) or political forums were disbanded and their 
members harassed or black-listed despite the fact that many 
considered themselves personal friends of the regime and har-
boring only reformist principles.  
 
 The Syria that emerged after the death of Hafez al-
Assad continued to view, with extreme suspicion, any form of 
autonomous institution that played a significant role in the lives 
of its community. Such institutions were regarded as intrinsi-
cally at odds with the type of power (both in terms of magni-
tude and breadth), which the Syrian government desired to 
maintain over its citizens. Reforms were only tolerated when 
they did not appear to necessitate any type of institutional re-
linquishment of power. Reforms that proved to demand such 
relinquishment, whether from the outset or over time, were re-
garded as both dangerous and unnecessary. The fact that the 
sanadiq had been proven positive from a development perspec-
tive was, from the standpoint of the security establishment, en-
tirely irrelevant. They had also been proven to be financially 
and administratively autonomous, and that was sufficient to 
incriminate them. In light of the above, it is indeed legitimate 
for one to be surprised not by the fact that the sanadiq were 
eventually dismantled, but by the fact that they were allowed to 
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